Friday, January 20, 2017

P v. Superior Ct. (Lara) (4th Dist., Div2) Application of Prop 57 to a Direct-File Case Currently Pending Trial Is Proper.

Prior to the November 9, 2016, inaction of Proposition 57, in certain situations, the State could choose to charge juvenile crimes in adult court.  It needed no judicial permission to do so.  Beginning on November 9, 2016, this changed.  The portions of Proposition 57 relevant for our purposes require all juvenile crimes to be commenced in juvenile court.  Once commenced in juvenile court, a juvenile case may be transferred to adult court, but it is the juvenile judge, not the State, that gets to make the decision.

March 2, 2016, the State charged one Master Lara as an adult for crimes he allegedly committed as a juvenile.  At the time, this was allowed.  While Lara was awaiting his trial in adult court, the voters passed Proposition 57.  On November 29, 2016, Lara moved the adult court to send his case to the juvenile court pursuant to Proposition 57.  The adult court granted Lara's motion and ordered the case transferred to juvenile court whereupon, if it wished, the State could ask the juvenile judge to make a decision as to in which court Lara's case should be tried.  The State filed a writ petition in the Court of Appeal.

The Fourth District denies the State's petition.

The intelligence of this decision is evinced by how the panel frames the question.  Whenever a voter initiative results in a change in the criminal law, lawyers tend to reflexively frame every contested issue of application as "whether the changes were meant to be retroactive".  As the panel here demonstrates, the proper analysis starts with whether the application at issue is one properly characterized as retroactive.  Because a change in the law is applied to a case commenced prior to the change does not necessarily mean the application is retroactive.

Having framed the issue correctly, the panel examines the relevant case law.  In an analogous case involving a change in the rules governing jury selection, the Court of Appeal held that the new rules applied to trials commencing after the rules change, even if the case had commenced prior to the changes.   Such an application was not retroactive, rather it was prospective.  Here too, holds the panel, the relevant parts of Proposition 57 address the conduct of trials commencing after the law change.  Proposition 57 says that the location of the trial, adult court or juvenile court, must be determined by the juvenile judge, not the State.  Applying this new law to Lara's case does not constitute an act of retroactivity.

The State tries to get around this conclusion by relying the the following citation from P v. Grant.
In general, application of a law is retroactive only if it attaches new legal consequences to, or increases a party’s liability for, an event, transaction, or conduct that was completed before the law’s effective date. [Citations.] Thus, the critical question for determining retroactivity usually is whether the last act or event necessary to trigger application of the statute occurred before or after the statute’s effective date.
This citation doesn't help the State that much.  Firstly because the panel doesn't think the facts here satisfy the conditions.  Secondly, the cited rule isn't necessarily determinative.  The phrase "only if" is a conditional statement, not biconditional.  In other words, for an application to be retroactive, the latter portion of the statement must always be true.  This is not the same as saying if the latter portion of the statement is true, the application is always retroactive.  The word "only" makes the difference.

The upshot is that Lara's case will now go to the juvenile court to have the juvenile judge make the decision as to in what court Lara will have his trial.