“Weed Crumbs” Scattered on a Car’s Rear Floorboard do not Constitute Probable Cause of a Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.3 Violation.”

 

Sellers v. Superior Court (Cal. Supremes, 01/29/2026)

 

Sellers was a passenger in a motorcar.  The police pulled the car over after the driver failed to come to a complete stop at a crosswalk.  Three cops approached the car, shined flashlights inside the car and began grilling Sellers and the driver.  A records check revealed nothing of concern.

One cop saw a rolling tray on the backseat and “weed crumbs,” on the rear floor.  The cops then described the driver as sweating and nervous.  They ordered the two out and searched the car.  An unregistered pistol was found near where Seller’s had been sitting.

Sellers was charged with unlawful possession of a gun.  He moved to suppress the evidence of the gun on the basis the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied Seller’s motion on the basis the “weed crumbs” constituted probable cause of a violation of  H&S §11362.3(a)(4) which prohibits the possession of marijuana that is “not in a closed package or container,” while driving or riding in a car.  Sellers appealed.

A split panel of the Third District affirmed, finding the crumbs were contraband being illegally transported as they were not in a “closed package or container.”  The Third hedged by alternately finding that even if the crumbs were not contraband, the driver’s nervousness, along with the rolling tray, constituted probable cause.  The dissenting judge analogized the weed crumbs to a small amount of beer spilled on a floorboard from a broken, (near) empty beer bottle.  Seller petitioned for review and the Cal Supremes granted same.

The Supremes reverse and remand.  The unanimous Court largely adopts the reasoning of the Third District judge’s dissent while adding its own gloss with a review of similar cases.  In re Randy C. (2024) 101 C.A.5^th 933 (a blunt on the passenger’s lap is an “open container”); P v. Hall (2020) 57 C.A.5^th 946 (loose marijuana on center console not a violation absent a “useable amount); P v. Thomas (1966) 246 C.A.2d 104 (fragments of marijuana in a shirt pocket not illegal).

In the end, the Cal Supremes hold that a violation of H&S §11362.3(a)(4) requires, at a minimum, marijuana be of a usable quantity, in a usable condition, and readily accessible to an occupant.  In this case, the crumbs were not in a useable condition nor were they readily accessible to Sellers.  The driver “nervousness,” falls on deaf judicial ears, as the Court quotes the trial court, “[t]here officers who are armed approaching a car would make most people nervous.” 

Seller’s Fourth Amendment rights having been violated, the case is remanded for a determination of the proper remedy.

 

 

 

 Penal Code Section 1385(c) does not apply to the alternate sentencing scheme of the “three strikes law."

 

People v. Grandberry (2^nd Dist., Div. 6, 01/22/2026)

 

In 2001, Grandberry was convicted of two person-present burglaries and found to have three prior strikes, three prior serious felonies, and one prior prison term.  After an initial appeal, he ended up with a sentence of 41-life (25-life for the burglaries, three 5-year enhancements for the prior serious felonies, and one year for the prison prior).

Fast forward to 2024 and Grandberry is back in court for a full resentencing on a Penal Code section 1117.25 petition.  He requests the court to strike one five-year prior serious felony enhancement and the one-year prison prior.  He also asks for two of his prior strikes to be stricken, for a new sentence of 22 years. 

The trial court applies Penal Code section 1385(c) to Grandberry’s five-year serious felony enhancements and strikes all three, also striking the one-year prior prison enhancement.  The trial court analyzes Grandberry’s request that two of his strikes be stricken is analyzed, not under the enumerated circumstances in 1385(c) that the court is directed to use in deciding whether to strike a sentencing enhancement , but under the “spirit of the law,” factors in Romero and its progeny.  After applying the Romero test, the trial court finds Grandberry falls within the spirit of the three strikes law and declines to strike the strikes, imposing a new sentence of 25-life.  Grandberry appeals.

This appellate panel affirms.  Grandberry argues that section 1385(c), not the Romero factors, is the proper method for analyzing whether his strikes should be stricken.  He argues two avenues as to why this should be so, [1] section 1385(c) is properly interpreted as applying to requests to strike strikes upon resentencing, and [2] even if not, the ambiguity of the statute merits the court applying the rule of lenity his favor. 

The panel’s response to both questions is based on the legal distinction between “enhancements,” and “alternative sentencing scheme.”  California’s three-strikes law has long been held to be an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement.  Hence, the panel says 1385(c) concerns only sentence enhancements and does not apply to a trial court’s analysis of whether to grant a defendant request to reject the alternative sentencing scheme (strike a strike).

And since the language of 1385(c), viewed within the universe of clear precedent, is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity has no application. 

 

 Grand Jury Transcripts and Police Reports Received by Grand Juries are Inadmissible at a PC §1172.6 Hearing.

 

People v. Dixon (4^th Dist., Div. 3, 01/26/26)

 

March 2007, a grand jury indicted Dixon for murder.  In 2009, Dixon pled nolo to murder in the second as part of a plea deal in which he received a 25-life sentence.  In 2019, he petitioned for resentencing under [now] PC §1172.6.  Following an erroneous summary dismissal, Dixon finally got his 1172.6 hearing in 2023. 

At the hearing, the plaintiff asked to admit into evidence, among other documents, the change of plea transcript, police reports, and portions of the grand jury transcript.  Dixon objected to the police reports and grand jury transcripts. 

Plaintiff argued the grand jury transcripts and police reports were admissible because Dixon had stipulated to them as a factual basis during his change of plea hearing.  The trial court rejected this argument but admitted them on the basis that grand jury transcripts were admissible under 1172.6(d)(3), which excepts “evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under the current law[.]”  Since the police reports were received by  the grand jury for its consideration, the trial court ruled them likewise admissible.

The trial court made extensive factual findings from the police reports and grand jury transcripts, found Dixon was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, and denied the petition.  Dixon appealed.

The appellate panel reverses and remands for a new hearing.

Whether grand jury transcripts are admissible in 1172.6 hearings is currently before the California Supremes in People v. Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5^th 854.  This panel agrees with the dissenting judge in Robinson and finds the grand jury transcripts inadmissible. 

The opinion’s analysis turns on the interpretation of two legal terms, “hearing,” and “admitted,” within the phrase “previously admitted at any hearing.”  The panel notes that grand jury proceedings are almost always referred to as “sessions” or “proceedings,” because grand juries are investigatory events, not adversarial adjudicative events. 

Much in the same vein, evidence is not “admitted,” to a grand jury (there is no judge present to make admissibility determinations) rather it is “received” by a grand jury.  The panel concludes that grand jury proceedings, entirely free from adversarial testing and without any presiding judge, fall short of the standards of reliability and fairness intended by the legislature for 1172.6 evidentiary hearings.

 

 

 Trial Court Errs in Overriding Psychologist’s Medical Opinion with Its Own and Making Factual Findings Without Substantial Evidence in Denying Mental Health Diversion.

 

Siam v. Superior Court (4^th Dist., Div. 3, 01/26/26)

 

In fall of 2020, Siam whacked his cab driver in the head with a skateboard and leapt out of the moving cab.  Siam was later found lying naked in a hotel elevator, sweating and spouting gibberish.  He was charged with assault with a deadly weapon for hitting the cabbie. 

Siam was then seen by one Dr. Kelin.  Kelin diagnosed Siam with paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission with medication.  Kelin found Siam not to be a violent or aggressive person and opined Siam’s violence against the cabbie stemmed from a paranoid break that made Siam fearful and delusional.  If Siam continued to take medication, attend therapy, and refrain from alcohol, Kelin thought Siam would respond positively.

Based in part on Kelin’s opinion, Siam was granted mental health diversion.  Siam complied with his treatment without incident until Spring 2022.

March 2022, a barefoot Siam walked into a Rolls Royce dealership and offered to buy “all of them,” with cash.  He left after trying to steal a hood ornament and making nonsensical statements.  Less than an hour later, Siam stole a yacht and crashed it into a seawall, injuring a woman on another craft, before being arrested and charged for vandalism, theft, etc.

At jail, Siam was transferred to the psych unit.  The staff psychiatrist , Dr. Haider, opined that if Siam were then released, he would meet the criteria for a 5150 involuntary commitment, but wasn’t dangerous to himself or others.  A delusional Siam refused the staff’s offer of psych meds.

Summer 2023, Siam was evaluated by psychologist Dr. Grajewski.  Grajewski noticed Siam’s medications were changed a week prior to his recent arrest.  He had previously been given medications for adjustment, panic, and anxiety disorders.  These were discontinued and new medications replaced them.

Grajewski concluded Siam had been misdiagnosed and undermedicated.  Grajewski diagnosed bipolar disorder along with panic and anxiety disorders, opining Siam was in an unmedicated manic phase on the day he stole the boat,  the mania keeping him from being able to make rational decisions or control delusional impulses.

Based in part on Grajewski’s reporting, Siam petitioned for mental health diversion in the boat case.  His diagnosed mental disorders were not excluded by statute; they played a large role in the offense; he would respond to treatment; he consented to treatment; and, consented to diversion.

The prosecution opposed diversion, offering no evidence rebutting or casting doubt on the opinions of Grajewski or Haider, instead making the argument that Siam “already had his chance,” at diversion in his 2020 case.

The trial court denied Siam’s diversion request.  It found Siam was eligible, but not suitable for two reasons.  First, it found Siam would not respond to treatment, and second, that Siam posed an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike” offense if treated in the community.

It based the first finding partly on the court’s opinion that just because a doctor says a patient can respond to treatment, “doesn’t really cut it.”  It also referenced Siam’s failure to successfully complete the 2020 grant of diversion, saying that if Siam had been misdiagnosed it was his own fault for not telling his doctors the treatment was not working, equating this “failure,” with refusing treatment.

To support its finding that Siam was likely to commit a super strike (murder, rape, bombings, etc.) if treated out of custody, it said that whacking someone in the head with a skateboard and stealing a boat are both things that “could lead to death.” 

Siam, having been denied a writ of mandate in the trial court, petitioned the Court of Appeal., which grants the writ and reverses the trial court’s factual determinations finding them unsupported by substantial evidence.

As to the trial court’s finding that Siam did not satisfy the treatment responsiveness element, the panel notes that the proper factual issue is whether, “in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert,” Siam’s symptoms would respond to treatment.  Since Grajewski was such an expert (and the only one to offer evidence), the trial court was required to base its decision on her opinion.  It was error to conclude Grajewski’s professional opinion, “didn’t cut it.”

On the super strike issue, the panel finds the facts upon which the trial court denied diversion were not supported by substantial evidence.  As the denial was based on two judicial errors, the panel reverses the denial of Siam’s diversion.  But rather than order the trial court to grant diversion, remands it for another hearing consistent with the mental health diversion statute, PC §1001.36 and the opinion.  But not before a paragraph reminding the trial court of the strong legislative preference that diversion “apply as broadly as possible,” and a tacit admonishment on the limitations on the court residual discretion to deny an eligible and suitable candidate. 

 

 

Public Defenders’ Acceptance of Appointment in Habeas Petitions under the Racial Justice Act is Discretionary.

 

Harmon v. Superior Court (4^th Dist., Div.2, 01/20/2026)

 

Reed, serving a 51-life sentence, petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus asking for relief under California’s Racial Justice Act (RJA) based upon the prosecutor and witnesses using racially discriminatory language.  The trial court found Reed’s petition stated facts which would constitute an RJA violation and set the case for an evidentiary hearing.

Reed’s retained lawyer withdrew prior to the hearing and the trial court appointed the Public Defender (PD).  The PD attempted to decline the appointment and requested alternate counsel be appointed.  The trial court held a hearing on the issue and ruled the PD was required to accept appointment, absent a conflict or unavailability.  The PD petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate.

In a 2-1 opinion, the panel holds that court appointments of the PD on RJA habeas cases may be declined at the PD’s discretion.

The issue is framed as whether RJA habeas appointments fall under subsection (a) or (g) of Government Code section 27706(a).  Gov. C. 22706 pertains to the scope of duties of PD offices.  Subsection (a) describes the circumstances upon which a PD “shall defend,” and subsection (g) describes circumstances under which a PD “may represent.”  Giving the words “shall” and “may” their ordinary meanings, the opinion says PDs have the discretion to decline appoints in (g) cases, while in (a) cases there is no such discretion.

In interpreting the statute, the majority notes sub(a) contains the phrases “shall defend,” and “conducting the defense,” while sub(g) uses the phrase “may represent.”  It finds this useful because in a habeas proceeding, the defendant actuals prosecutes the writ; he defends nothing.  The panel also notes habeas proceedings are “separate actions” from the criminal case. 

Along with citations to instructive (but on on-point) cases, the majority finds RJA habeas proceedings fall under the “may represent” of sub(g).  Thus, a PD has discretion whether to accept a court’s appointment.  The writ is issued with directions to vacate the order compelling the PD to represent Reed and appoint someone else. 

There is a curious concurrence.  This justice interprets the two subsections differently, finding sub(a) applies to cases where a defendant has a right, statutory or Constitutional, to an attorney while sub(g) applies to cases where no right to counsel exists but where appointment is permissible.  This isn’t the curious part.  The curious part is the concurrence states it agrees with the result, remanding to the trial court to determine, “whether the public defender has a conflict . . . or is unavailable[.}”  Which isn’t the result at all. 

 

 Failure of the Government to Comply with PC §853.6(a) does not Absolve a Defendant’s FTAs from Consideration among the Barker Factors for 6^th Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis.

 

People v. Superior Court (4^th Dist., Div.2, 1/16/26)

 

One Ms. Lashelle was arrested for DUI on October 2, 2021.  She was released upon a promise to appear in court December 12, 2021.  November 17, 2021, the prosecutor filed a misdemeanor complaint charging her with DUI.

Lashelle bench warranted after she failed to appear on December 12, 2021.  She was later arrested on the warrant and released on another promise to appear with which she failed to comply and picked up another bench warrant.  Years later, in March of 2024, she voluntarily placed herself on calendar and did appear and pled not guilty. 

January 2025, Lashelle moved to dismiss her case for a violation of her 6^th Amendment right to a speedy trial.  The trial judge denied her motion, ruling that the years long delay was her own doing.

Lashelle petitioned the Appellate Division of the trial court for a writ, which was granted.  The Appellate Division ruled that because the prosecution had not filed the complaint within 25 days of Lashelle’s arrest, the government had no right to demand her appearance in court.  This, the Division ruled, meant the trial court had no personal jurisdiction over her.  Consequently, any delays due to Lashelle’s failing to appear when she promised could not be considered in determining whether the delay from arrest to trial was her fault.

The prosecutor filed a document in the Fourth District Appellate Court which it labeled a “petition for transfer.”  A panel of the Fourth treats it as a petition for a writ.  And it grants the writ petition.

The panel spends a lot of ink navigating the abstruse topic of appellate procedure, pleading, and jurisdiction.  In the merits portion of the opinion, the panel points out the Appellate Division’s errors. 

For purposes of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, a delay of over a year from arrest to trial is presumptively prejudicial for a misdemeanor case.  This presumptive finding triggers an analysis under what are known as the Barker factors from the case Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514.   The Barker analysis includes determining which side is more to blame for the delay. 

The panel points out that just because the prosecutor failed to file the complaint within 25 days of Lashelle’s arrest, it did not lose the right to demand her appearance.  In fact, failing to appear in such circumstances is a new crime for which one can be fines and subsequently arrested.  The second error is finding that a trial court loses jurisdiction if no complaint if filed within 25 days, pointing out the effect of such a failure is merely to strip the promise to appear of its status as an accusatory pleading. 

In the end, the panel holds that Lashelle’s failures to show up to court when she promised can be held against her as a Barker factor.  With that, the case is remanded to the trial court to hold another hearing on her speedy trial motion.     

 

 

 

 

 

 Holding a hearing and entering a denial on the merits in response to a defendant’s “invitation” to the court to exercise its discretion to resentence per PC §1172.1, creates an appealable issue.

People v. Craig (2^nd Dist., Div.7, 01/15/2026)

Craig took a plea deal in 2015 for 23 years, pleading guilty to clothing store robberies.  It was a second-striker sentence with enhancements for use of a gun, PC §12022.53(b), and having a prior serious felony, PC §667(a)(1).

In 2024, following the passage of sentencing reform laws, Craig filed with the trial court a PC §1172.1, “petition” to recall his 23-year sentence and conduct a full resentencing under current law.  In response, the trial court held a hearing in November 2024.

At the hearing, the court heard argument from Craig and the prosecutor.  Craig highlighted his rehabilitation while in prison, his employment plans upon release, his young age at the time of the robbery, and the Craig’s codefendant had received a resentencing where his prior serious felony enhancement had been stricken.  The prosecutor recited the effect of Craig’s crime upon his victims and Craig’s prison rule violations. 

The trial court said it considered Craig’s documents, the case history, the plea agreement, and details of the offense.  The court said defendants who accept plea agreements need to live up to their end of the bargain.  It was not persuaded that Craig “was young and that he has ‘rehabilitated’ himself.”  It denied the “petition.”  Craig appealed. 

This panel reverses and remands for a new hearing.

The AG’s first contention is that Craig has no right to appeal.  This because a defendant is not authorized to initiate a recall and resentence under PC §1172.1.  Those authorized to initiate proceedings under 1172.1 include CDCR, the prosecutor, and the trial court (upon changes in law).  A defendant has no ability to “file a petition,” under 1172.1.  What a defendant may do is “invite” or ask the trial court to initiate 1172.1 proceedings on the court’s own motion.  However, a court is not required to respond to a defendant’s invitation, 1172.1(c). 

By statute, a defendant has a right to appeal a court order that affects their substantial rights.  The AG points out, correctly, that Craig has no substantial right to initiate his own 1172.1 resentencing.  AG cites to cases holding no right to appeal when a defendant invites 1172.1 resentencing and the trial court summarily denies the invitation.

Craig responds that here the court did not summarily deny his invitation, rather it ordered and held a hearing, took and weighed evidence, and gave a statement of reasons supporting its denial.  This, Craig argues, was a decision on the merits which effected his substantial rights, not a summary denial.

The panel agrees finding the trial court’s actions in holding a hearing, taking and weighing evidence, and ruling on the merits was a constructive acceptance of Craig’s “invitation,” to resentence on the court’s own motion.  The opinion points out the trial court proceeded in the same way it would have if an authorized party (prosecutor, CDCR, etc.) had initiated the process, finding Craig’s substantial rights were affected and a right to appeal attached.

On to the merits of the appeal, the panel finds the trial court erred in two ways.  First, it denied resentencing based on its belief someone who takes a plea bargain must honor it.  This is an improper reason.  “Trial courts are not bound by the terms of an earlier plea agreement when resentencing under [1172.1].  Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4^th 64, 66.  

Second, the trial court did not consider that which it was legally required to consider, Craig’s  rehabilitation efforts and young age at the time of the crime.  The court, “shall consider postconviction factors, included . . . the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated.”  PC §1172.1(a)(5).

The panel finds these two errors were prejudicial.  That had trial court not committed the two errors, it was more likely than not Craig would have been resentenced.  The upshot is Craig gets another 1172.1 hearing where the trial court will, hopefully, apply the correct law.