After the Supreme Court of the United States held that California's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) was operating its prisons in a manner that violated the Eight Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment", the legislative fix was Assembly Bill 109, statutory changes collectively termed "Realignment". One of the major changes was that certain felony sentences would now be served in local jails, instead of CDCR. The statutory sentences were not reduced, rather the facility where they would be served was changed. Prior to Realignment, the rubric for sentences was, in most cases, simple: misdemeanor = county jail, while felony = CDCR ("prison").
After realignment it is not so simple. Misdemeanor still = county jail, however felonies can be either county jail or CDCR (depending on the particulars of the charges and defendant). Issues have arisen because the preexisting penal code still uses the old terminology, meaning it delineates between misdemeanants and felons based upon where they serve their sentence. So where do these "new" sentences (felony sentences to county jails) fit in to statutes predating Realignment? This case answers that question within the context of penal code section 1203.2a.
Mendoza pled to four drug related charges in Riverside County and was placed on probation. Subsequently she got into trouble in San Bernardino County and pled guilty to a drug felony. The San Bernardino judge sentenced Mendoza to serve 16 months (a felony sentence) in the San Bernardino County jail. While in the San Bernardino jail, Mendoza sent a written demand, pursuant to PC 1203.2a, to the Riverside court demanding her probation be terminated and that she be sentenced in absentia and without a lawyer. For some reason, the Riverside court's response when Mendoza's case was called was, "[w]e'll just drop it.". More than three months later, Mendoza appeared in Riverside court and admitted violating her probation whereupon the court reinstated her on probation. She appealed.
Under penal code section 1203.2a, if a probationer is subsequently "confined in a prison in this state" on another charge, and she makes an effective written demand to the probationary court to terminate her probation and impose sentence, the probationary court has 30 or 60 days (depending on whether sentence had been previously imposed) to act, otherwise it loses jurisdiction. The primary issue in this case is whether Mendoza, serving a felony sentence in a county jail, satisfied the statutory requirement of being "confined in a prison in this state". The secondary issue is whether Mendoza's written demand was effective even though it lacked an "attestation" by the "warden or the warden's representative" as required in 1203.2a. This Fourth District panel answers both questions with "yes".
The government argues that "prison" means CDCR and that unless a person is confined within a CDCR facility they are not "confined in a prison" for purposes of 1203.2a. The court rejects this argument and holds that equal protection considerations require 1203.2a to apply to felons serving sentences in county jails (which the court slyly calls "county prisons", a new (to me) term they appear to just make-up). As for the secondary issue of whether Mendoza's written demand was legally effective despite the lack of the attestation by the warden, the panel states quite clearly that, "[t]he lack of attestation is
not a condition precedent to the validity of a request under Penal Code section 1203.2a". Which is a good thing because it would be difficult to get an attestation from the "warden" of a county jail as county jails do not have "wardens", rather they are run by a sheriff and the sheriff's staff.
As it ends, the Riverside court lost its jurisdiction over Mendoza when it failed to act within the statutory limits after receiving her demand. The court had no power to find her in violation of probation and reinstate her probation.
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