P v. Ruff (5th Dist.) PC 1170.18 Relief Doesn't Include Dismissal of Previously Imposed Prior Prison Term (Agreeing with P v. Valenzuela)

In 2013, James Ruff was convicted of second degree robbery and found to have multiple "prison priors", one-year enhancements pursuant to PC 667.5(b).  The trial judge sentenced Ruff to five years on the robbery plus two prison priors, for a total of seven years.

Subsequent to November 2014, while his robbery appeal was pending, Ruff petitioned under PC 1170.18 to reduce one of the two "prison prior" cases to a misdemeanor.  The petition was granted.  Before the appellate court, Ruff now argues his sentence should be reduced by one year because the conviction which provides the basis for the enhancement has now been deemed a "misdemeanor for all purposes".

The Fifth Circuit panel disagrees.  With reasoning similar to the Fourth District in P v. Valenzuela, the panel holds that as long as a conviction supporting a 667.5(b) enhancement was a felony when the new crime was committed, a subsequent misdemeanor reduction under 1170.18 is of no effect.  

The opinion is on point as to the issue; what is the proper interpretation of the words "for all purposes" within the context of PC 1170.18.  The first step is a determination of whether the language is ambiguous or not.  Clearly it is ambiguous, "for all purposes" can reasonably mean for all time, or it can reasonably mean from here on out.  Ambiguity declared, a resort to secondary sources for an indication of voter intent is the proper course.  

The panel begins with the penal codes' proclamation that all legislation is presumed to be prospective only, saving evidence of a contrary intent.  Then, looking at the voter guide, the panel notes it doesn't really express any intent to reduce the prison terms of offenders whose crimes of conviction were still deemed dangerous enough to merit prison (Ruff's sentence was for armed robbery).  

Finally, the panel distinguishes cases in which a defendant has her conviction reduced to a misdemeanor prior to committing a new offense.  In such cases, the California Supreme Court has held that the conviction, being a misdemeanor at the time the new offense was committed, cannot be the basis for a felony prior enhancement.  Here, as in Valenzuela, the prior at issue was still a felony when the defendant committed the new offense.

There are some considered non-specious arguments for a contrary holding, but the panel's holding is on solid ground.  What I appreciate most about this opinion is that it conducts a proper statutory analysis and does so in a thoughtful manner.  There are no short-cuts, or citations to dubious authority in this opinion.