Back in 1995, Mr. Vasquez was convicted of felony petty theft with a prior and sentenced to 16 months in the state prison. Vasquez did his time and was released.
Come 2015, Vasquez returns to court and petitions for relief under Penal Code section 1170.18, a statute added by 2014's Proposition 47. Section 1170.18 allows some people who are currently serving a sentence for a felony committed before November 5, 2014, that would have been a misdemeanor if convicted after November 5 (such as petty theft with a prior), to have their felony sentences recalled, have the crime declared a misdemeanor, and be resentenced as a misdemeanant. Section 1170.18 also allows such people who have already completed their felony sentence to return to court and have their conviction declared a misdemeanor.
Vasquez had already completed his sentence when he petitioned for relief. But he asked the trial court, in addition to declaring his conviction a misdemeanor, to vacate his 16 month prison sentence. The trial court agreed that Vasquez was entitled to have his case declared a misdemeanor and did so. However the trial court disagreed that it had the jurisdiction to recall Vasquez's completed 16 month sentence and refused to do so. Vasquez appealed.
A Fourth District panel affirms.
To those unfamiliar with the intersection of state criminal law and federal immigration law, the issue may seem without consequence. However, the consequence to Vasquez (and many others) looms large. Immigration law specifies certain categories of criminal offenses that make a person removable from, or inadmissible to, the United States. One of the criteria used to categorize criminal offenses is the maximum sentence under state law. Generally, but not always, crimes punishable by one year or more have more severe immigration consequences than those punishable by less than one year (thus the reason California reduced the maximum penalty for misdemeanors from 365 days to 364 days).
So while Vasquez has been out of prison for nearly 20 years, it may matter greatly how the immigration courts view the length of his sentence.
But the consequences to Vasquez are not really the issue being decided by the panel. The issue is whether section 1170.18 gives a trial court the power to vacate a completed sentence over which, under common law, the court would have no jurisdiction. This panel answers "no". The analysis is a pretty straight forward textual examination. Section 1170.18 really doesn't say anything about recalling or vacating a sentence already served. That language is confined to the subsections dealing with persons currently serving their sentences. The panel appears somewhat sympathetic to Vasquez's situation, but without any tools (other than sympathy) to find the lawmakers intended to give trial courts such power, they decline to do so.
Vasquez really only has one decent argument and that involves the language that all cases reduced to misdemeanors (whether currently serving or having completed a sentence) are deemed to be misdemeanors "for all purposes". He argues that the phrase "for all purposes" should include the federal immigration statutes. But the panel, stating Vasquez's immigration matter is not before them, declines to adopt this reasoning.
The only other argument I can think of that could have been made was that if Vasquez's crime is now a misdemeanor, his prior 16 month sentence would constitute an illegal sentence. And I believe courts are always within their jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence. But this probably wouldn't have gotten far since the sentence was legal when it was imposed.
I am sure this issue will make its way to the Ninth Circuit in due time.
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