The authorities went to conduct a probation search of Probationer's home, which she leased. The home's garage had been converted into a living area. When the authorities arrived, Probationer told them that the house was hers and her boyfriend's and that Ms. Carreon was staying in the converted garage.
While conducting a protective sweep, the officers found the door to the garage closed, but not locked. They opened the door and inside the dark room was Carreon's young son. The officers told Carreon to remove her son from the room and stand by, which she did.
Once the premises were cleared, the search began. The officers reentered the garage and searched some dresser drawers, finding some papers that were consistent with drug-dealing. A purse within the room was also searched and found to contain methamphetamine. Carreon later admitted to selling the drug.
Carreon moved to suppress the methamphetamine and papers on the basis the searches of the dresser and purse violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The magistrate denied the motion. Carreon then raised the issue in the Superior Court via a Penal Code section 995 motion, which was also denied. She subsequently pleaded guilty and appealed.
The Sixth District reverses, holding the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.
This opinion is required reading for its exemplary analysis of the "common authority" theory of consent, an issue whose mention outnumbers its understanding by at least 100 to 1. The critical issue is whether an objectively reasonable officer could believe that a host had authority to consent to the search her guest's purse or the dresser inside the room the guest was occupying. The panel, rightly IMEO, answers this question, "no".
Reading this opinion made me think of an interesting hypothetical. If I am on probation and let my apartment via Airbnb, does a consent-to-search term of my probation mean the poor sap renting my apartment is subject to a valid search while he is in possession?
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