P v. Jones (4th Dist., Div.2) Summary Denial of PC 1170.18 Petition Reversed; Denial of Post Conviction Motion to Dismiss Prior Prison Term Affirmed

In 2013, Mr. Casey Jones sauntered into a Walgreens and stashed approximately 36 dollars worth of soap into his trousers before attempting to leave the store without paying.  For this he was convicted of second degree commercial burglary, PC 459.  Additionally, Jones admitted having served a prior prison term for a felony conviction of petty-theft-with-a-prior, former PC 666.  He was sentenced and began serving his sentence.

After November 5, 2014, Jones filed a petition to reduce his prior PC 666 conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to PC 1170.18.  This petition was granted.

Then Jones filed another PC 1170.18 petition to reduce his current PC 459 felony conviction to a misdemeanor and to strike the prior prison term enhancement imposed on the basis of his, now misdemeanor, PC 666 conviction.  The trial court denied both requests.  While the prior prison term request was denied following a argument and analysis, the PC 459 reduction was denied without comment.  Jones appealed.

The Fourth District affirms the denial of the request to strike the prior prison term enhancement, but reverses the denial of the PC 459 reduction.

The panel's affirmance of the denial regarding the prior prison term proceeds by way of statutory analysis.  The panel holds that nothing in PC 1170.18 provides a procedure for the dismissal or striking of enhancements.  While I have no quibble with the result, I  find this broad statement less than convincing.

While there is no explicit language in 1170.18 regarding enhancements, it is unavoidable that 1170.18 will necessarily result in the dismissing and/or striking of certain enhancements.  Prior prison terms may only be applied to felony sentences.  In a case where a defendant is currently serving a sentence for a felony commercial burglary conviction and prior prison term enhancements, if this defendant's 1170.18 petition is granted as to the burglary conviction, resentencing requires the court to strike the prior prison term enhancements.  Ditto for "strike" priors, which only apply to felony convictions.

But the result is reasonable, given that the 666 conviction remained a felony when Jones committed the instant offenses.  Far more interesting is the issue of whether a 1170.18 reduction, granted prior to a current conviction, renders an otherwise qualifying prior prison term incapable of supporting a prior prison term enhancement. 

 On this issue, I side with the P v. Abdallah decision, finding it far superior to the that in P v. Acosta.