P v. Lozano (2nd. Dist., Div.5): Juveniles Sentenced to LWOP Prior to SCOTUS Decision in Miller May Present Post-Conviction Evidence of Rehabilitation at Resentencing.

Ms. Lozano, age 16, lured her 13 year old friend into the woods and murdered her 13 year old friend with two gunshots to the head when the friend refused to hand over her jewelry.  Lozano was  convicted of murder during a robbery and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). This was in 1996 when California courts (understandably) thought the default penalty for juveniles guilty of such murders was LWOP.

Lozano's behavior during her initial years in prison was awful.  She was part of a scheme to smuggle dope into prison for which she was convicted and received an additional six years.  But then Lozano began to mature.  As the panel notes.

Lozano earned her GED and an AA college degree; a laudatory declaration from a former warden of the California Institution for Women; various certificates of completion of vocational courses; participation in numerous self-help programs related to alcohol and substance abuse and coping skills; participation in programs involving the consequences of criminality on victims, participation and leadership in programs relating to juvenile offenders; election to the inmate council that works in conjunction with prison administration; participation in an outreach program to prevent juveniles from participating in crime, including personal communication with some participants; and over 30 laudatory comments from prison staff including descriptions of her transformation from an immature inmate to a person dedicated to helping others avoid the mistakes that lead to her incarceration. 

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile crimes violated the Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because such sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  Because, at the time Lozano was sentenced, LWOP sentences were de facto mandatory (the California Supreme Court, following Miller, scrambled to pen an opinion holding California's statutory scheme did not create a presumption of LWOP for juvenile special circumstance murders, past practice having been otherwise), she was entitled to be resentenced.

At her resentencing, Lozano wanted to introduce her record while in prison, the good and the bad.  The trial judge understood he was to sentence Lozano, necessarily making findings of Lozano's likelihood of rehabilitation, upon the facts as they existed in 1996 and excluded all evidence of Lozano's prison record (direct evidence of actual rehabilitation).  The result of this anachronistic drama was that the judge found there was no possibility a 16 year old Lozano could be rehabilitated and he sentenced her again to LWOP.

The Second District reverses and remands for a new sentencing hearing where Lozano will be allowed to present her prison record. 

I do not envy the panel, or the trial judge, in this case.  While logic would dictate Lozano's prison record would be the best evidence as to whether Lozano can be rehabilitated and safely integrated back into society, the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Miller appears (to me) to suggest that while it is unwise to make the decision of whether a juvenile should ever be eligible for parole at the outset (while the person is still young), it is sometimes okay to do so.  The reasoning behind Miller is that predicting whether an immature human's crimes are a result of transitory immaturity likely to resolve, or the result of irreparable corruption, is unlikely to be reliable at the outset.  But that is when sentencing occurs.

This panel makes the logical (if not legally air-tight) choice and allows the trial judge to reconsider Lozano's likelihood of rehabilitation with the aid of her actual record of rehabilitation.