Mr. Perez agreed to help one Mr. Jasso commit a robbery. Jasso hailed a taxi and Perez followed the taxi in his Nissan. Jasso then robbed the taxi driver of 200 dollars; he also shot and killed him. Perez provided the getaway and disposed of the murder gun, receiving 100 dollars for his participation.
Police eventually learned of Perez's role and took him in for questioning. After Perez had steadfastly denied any involvement, the policeman told Perez that if he was truthful and honest, "we are not gonna charge you with anything", adding that Perez had the policeman's "word" that "you'll have your life, maybe you'll go into the Marines". Perez then confessed.
At trial, the judge denied Perez's motion to suppress his confession. Perez was convicted of murder.
The Fourth District reverses. This is not a surprise. The United States Supreme Court has held that when the motivating factor of a confession is an express promise of leniency or advantage, the confession is involuntary and must be suppressed. Here the trial judge denied the motion based on statements the police made after Perez had confessed. You read that right. The Hon. Richard Erwood ruled that Perez was motivated to confess by statements the police made after Perez confessed. Such an excerebrose ruling can only be the result of judicial sloth, prejudicial bias, or a cynical and calculated decision to eschew clearly established law with an eye towards reelection.
Clearly the panel has no faith in Judge Erwood's future competence at a retrial. The opinion, absent a strict legal need, proceeds to point out two other clear errors by Erwood and orders him not to commit the same errors at any retrial.
Ouch.
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