At the jury trial, the prosecution chiefly relied upon the testimony of its expert, a forensic psychiatrist (who was paid 90K for his services according to the opinion). During his testimony, the psychiatrist gave detailed recitations of Landau's hospital records and chart entries by other physicians. Following the psychiatrist's testimony, the state called Landau to the stand and questioned him as part of its case in chief.
The jury found that Landau remained a danger to the health and safety of others and was likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if discharged. Landau appealed.
The Fourth District reverses in a comprehensive opinion that, while thoroughly analyzing the issues presented, functions as an excellent primer on SVP proceedings.
The initial issue is whether Landau was denied equal protection under the law when he was forced to testify in the state's case in chief. An analogous issue within the context of Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) proceedings was recently addressed by the Fourth District in People v. Dunley. While SVP proceedings are not criminal and are not required to include a right not to give evidence against oneself, they are substantially similar to NGI commitment proceedings, which include a statutory right coextensive with the U.S. Constitution's right against self incrimination. Being substantially similar, disparate treatment within the two proceedings must be justified by the state under the applicable standard of review. Because the state did not advance an argument in the appeal, the panel instructs the trial court, upon remand, to allow the state a chance to justify the different treatment prior to ruling on whether the state, at any retrial, may force the Landau to give testimony on behalf of the state.
The main issue is then addressed; whether the court erred in permitting the state's expert from testifying extensively as to hearsay, specifically facts within hospital reports and medical charts of which the expert had no personal knowledge. The state argued that the hearsay was not offered for its truth, but as a basis for the experts opinion. In response, the panel examines the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Illinois, a case in which a majority of the Court determined that hearsay evidence introduced for the purpose of explaining an expert's opinion is in fact offered for the truth. The panel concludes the hearsay here was offered for its truth and proceeds to examine the contested statements in detail.
In the end, the panel concludes that the hearsay contained in hospital and medical records was admitted in error and was prejudicial, requiring reversal.
Finally, the issue of whether the jury should have been instructed on both conditional release and unconditional release is resolved. The panel determines as Landau's petition included both requests for unconditional and conditional release, the jury should have been instructed as to both and the trial court is instructed to do so on remand.
The jury found that Landau remained a danger to the health and safety of others and was likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if discharged. Landau appealed.
The Fourth District reverses in a comprehensive opinion that, while thoroughly analyzing the issues presented, functions as an excellent primer on SVP proceedings.
The initial issue is whether Landau was denied equal protection under the law when he was forced to testify in the state's case in chief. An analogous issue within the context of Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) proceedings was recently addressed by the Fourth District in People v. Dunley. While SVP proceedings are not criminal and are not required to include a right not to give evidence against oneself, they are substantially similar to NGI commitment proceedings, which include a statutory right coextensive with the U.S. Constitution's right against self incrimination. Being substantially similar, disparate treatment within the two proceedings must be justified by the state under the applicable standard of review. Because the state did not advance an argument in the appeal, the panel instructs the trial court, upon remand, to allow the state a chance to justify the different treatment prior to ruling on whether the state, at any retrial, may force the Landau to give testimony on behalf of the state.
The main issue is then addressed; whether the court erred in permitting the state's expert from testifying extensively as to hearsay, specifically facts within hospital reports and medical charts of which the expert had no personal knowledge. The state argued that the hearsay was not offered for its truth, but as a basis for the experts opinion. In response, the panel examines the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Illinois, a case in which a majority of the Court determined that hearsay evidence introduced for the purpose of explaining an expert's opinion is in fact offered for the truth. The panel concludes the hearsay here was offered for its truth and proceeds to examine the contested statements in detail.
In the end, the panel concludes that the hearsay contained in hospital and medical records was admitted in error and was prejudicial, requiring reversal.
Finally, the issue of whether the jury should have been instructed on both conditional release and unconditional release is resolved. The panel determines as Landau's petition included both requests for unconditional and conditional release, the jury should have been instructed as to both and the trial court is instructed to do so on remand.
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