Wednesday, April 13, 2016

P v. Weddington (2nd Dist., Div.1) Is Casing a House "Preparation for" or "Commencement of"a Burglary?

Mr. Weddington was part of a trio that greatly underestimated the forethought of the LA police.  The trio was seen cruising a residential neighborhood in a red Chrysler, stopping periodically for the driver to get out and knock on a home's front door.  After receiving no answer, the driver went back to the car and drove to a spot in the back alley behind the home.  Unaware a policeman had been following them, the trio popped the trunk on the Chrysler and got out.  Upon seeing the police car, they got back in and cheesed it, but eventually were apprehended.  The trunk of the Chrysler contained a crowbar, a modified screwdriver, a window punch, a pair of two-way radios, and a couple pair of gloves.

Approximately three weeks later, Weddington and his two cohorts were out of custody and again rollin' in the red Chrysler.  The LAPD was, to the surprise of no one save the trio, following them.  The trio again cruised a residential neighborhood, stopping periodically for the driver (Weddington's codefendant) to get out, knock on the front door of a home and, receiving no reply, check out the side yard.  Despite receiving no answer at the first four homes, the trio made no move to burgle these.  The fifth home was the charm, though, and when the trio exited the house with pillowcases full of loot, they were greeted by a convoy of unmarked police cars.

Again the trio cheesed it, this time running a series of red lights at high speed while tossing the loot out the windows of the Chrysler, hitting the windshield of the pursuing police car.  Eventually the Chrysler crashed and the trio, despite making a run for it, were arrested.

A jury convicted Weddington of, among other crimes, one count of residential burglary, four counts of attempted residential burglary, and one count of felony evasion.  Weddington appealed.

A Second District panel, in a 2-1 decision, affirms the convictions.

The primary issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the four convictions for attempted burglary.  In this case a valid attempted residential burglary conviction requires evidence that the defendant had the specific intent to enter a residence to steal stuff, and did a direct but ineffectual act towards making such an entrance.  However, the "direct but ineffectual act" requires conduct that goes beyond ‘mere preparation'.  And it is the location of the end of the preparation spectrum that divides the panel.

It is a difficult task to make a meaningful distinction between "preparation" to commit a crime and an "ineffectual act towards" committing the crime.  Where does one end and the other begin?  Is loading up a red Chrysler with window punches, crowbars, and latex gloves mere preparation to burgle, or is it an ineffectual act towards committing a burglary.  What about driving to the target house?  What if you slowly drive past the house, but upon seeing the owner home, you call it quits and go home? Where is the line?

The majority frees itself from this difficult task by invoking judicial deference to jury verdicts.  There is much to be said for this approach.  Sometimes the best tact is to say, "look, I don't know exactly where the line between preparation and commencement is and I don't need to know, all that I need to be convinced of is that the jury's choice of where to place the line was reasonable."

The dissent tries to solve the issue with greater precision and I leave it to the reader to rate its success.  Pointing to language in previous cases that use the concept of "equivocation" to distinguish acts of preparation from acts of commencement, the dissent comes to the conclusion that the trio was still equivocal when casing the four homes.  Because the trio decided not to burgle the homes, even after their knocking went unanswered, the dissent finds the trio was still equivocal and thus did not cross the line from preparation to commencement.

While this equivocation rule has some logical appeal, it may be just a restatement of the requirement of showing a specific intent, confusing the actus reus with the mens rea.  P v. Zaun confronted a very similar set of facts, but framed the issue as one of specific intent instead of whether the action was one beyond preparation.

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