P v. Blackwell (1st Dist, Div.5) & P v. Bell (2nd Dist, Div.8): Elected California Judiciary Says "No Thanks" to U.S. Supreme Court's Guidance on Juvenile Sentencing

In years recent, the United States Supreme Court has issued opinions holding specific criminal punishments constitute cruel and unusual punishment when applied to children.  In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to execute someone for a crime they committed as a child.  Following Simmons, the Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, declared mandatory "life without parole" (LWOP) sentences unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders.  Finally in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that Miller to apply retroactively to juvenile offenders previously sentenced under mandatory LWOP schemes.  

Importantly, Miller did not hold that all LWOP sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional, only that mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes were unconstitutional.  Miller required that before an LWOP sentence could be imposed upon a child offender, the sentencing court must consider the child's age, background and chances at rehabilitation.  

IMEO, Miller and Montgomery are unlikely to have much effect in courts with elected judges.  Rather than affecting any real change, these decisions simply impose upon such courts a requirement that before they impose LWOP sentences on juveniles, they recite some standard language about how they considered certain facts before arriving at a determination that LWOP was the proper sentence.  Despite Justice Anthony Kennedy's warning that LWOP sentences for juveniles should be a rare occurrence, the reality will likely prove otherwise.

Here Blackwell was sentenced to LWOP for a crime he commited when he was 17.  Due to Montgomery, Blackwell now returns to the trial court for reconsideration.  The trial court, after reciting the necessary language, again imposes LWOP and the First District affirms.

Bell was sentenced to 43 years to life for crimes he committed when he was 14.  He argues that such a sentence is cruel and unusual and the functional equivalent of LWOP.  The Second District affirms, finding a shot at parole when Bell turns 57 is not the same as LWOP and is neither cruel nor unusual.

Despite Justice Kennedy's admonition, I am willing to bet that California's elected judiciary will find that "rare" means "more than 70 percent".