P v. Lopez (2nd Dist, Div.6) A Juvenile Cannot Be Penalized For Exercising His Constitutional Rights

While a juvenile, Master Lopez committed an aggravated kidnapping.  It was 1994 and life without the possibility of parole for juveniles was all the rage.  Lopez was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus nine years.  

Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held that giving juveniles LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Lopez then had the cheek to assert his Constitutional right and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.  The trial court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's holding and modified Lopez's sentence to life with the possibility of parole.

Following this sentence modification, the California legislature created Penal Code section 1170(d)(2), which allowed people who were under 18 at the time of crimes for which they were sentenced to LWOP to petition the trial court for a recall of sentence.

Lopez filed his 1170(d)(2) petition (25 years after his crime) and it was granted.  Lopez was resentenced to life with parole, the execution of sentence was suspended and Lopez was placed on probation for five years.  The State appealed.

The Second District affirms.

Ignoring the Jewish axiom to "loath mastery over others", the State argues the following:  because Lopez had earlier asserted his Eighth Amendment right to be free from an LWOP sentence, he forfeited his PC 1170(d)(2) right to petition for recall of sentence.  In other (cynical) words, because Lopez had earlier asserted his right to be free of an unconstitutional sentence and was given life with the possibility of parole, he gave up his right to a 1170(d)(2) petition.  

The Second District will have nothing of this, and affirms.  My only criticism is that the form of analysis could have been more disciplined.  The statute at issue is temporally ambiguous, providing the gateway to a look into the legislative intent behind the law.  As punishing defendants for asserting their Constitutional rights is not a recognized legislative intent, any future textual argument can thus be foreclosed.

But this is niggling.  The decision is sound.