Failure of the Government to Comply with PC §853.6(a) does not Absolve a Defendant’s FTAs from Consideration among the Barker Factors for 6^th Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis.

 

People v. Superior Court (4^th Dist., Div.2, 1/16/26)

 

One Ms. Lashelle was arrested for DUI on October 2, 2021.  She was released upon a promise to appear in court December 12, 2021.  November 17, 2021, the prosecutor filed a misdemeanor complaint charging her with DUI.

Lashelle bench warranted after she failed to appear on December 12, 2021.  She was later arrested on the warrant and released on another promise to appear with which she failed to comply and picked up another bench warrant.  Years later, in March of 2024, she voluntarily placed herself on calendar and did appear and pled not guilty. 

January 2025, Lashelle moved to dismiss her case for a violation of her 6^th Amendment right to a speedy trial.  The trial judge denied her motion, ruling that the years long delay was her own doing.

Lashelle petitioned the Appellate Division of the trial court for a writ, which was granted.  The Appellate Division ruled that because the prosecution had not filed the complaint within 25 days of Lashelle’s arrest, the government had no right to demand her appearance in court.  This, the Division ruled, meant the trial court had no personal jurisdiction over her.  Consequently, any delays due to Lashelle’s failing to appear when she promised could not be considered in determining whether the delay from arrest to trial was her fault.

The prosecutor filed a document in the Fourth District Appellate Court which it labeled a “petition for transfer.”  A panel of the Fourth treats it as a petition for a writ.  And it grants the writ petition.

The panel spends a lot of ink navigating the abstruse topic of appellate procedure, pleading, and jurisdiction.  In the merits portion of the opinion, the panel points out the Appellate Division’s errors. 

For purposes of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, a delay of over a year from arrest to trial is presumptively prejudicial for a misdemeanor case.  This presumptive finding triggers an analysis under what are known as the Barker factors from the case Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514.   The Barker analysis includes determining which side is more to blame for the delay. 

The panel points out that just because the prosecutor failed to file the complaint within 25 days of Lashelle’s arrest, it did not lose the right to demand her appearance.  In fact, failing to appear in such circumstances is a new crime for which one can be fines and subsequently arrested.  The second error is finding that a trial court loses jurisdiction if no complaint if filed within 25 days, pointing out the effect of such a failure is merely to strip the promise to appear of its status as an accusatory pleading. 

In the end, the panel holds that Lashelle’s failures to show up to court when she promised can be held against her as a Barker factor.  With that, the case is remanded to the trial court to hold another hearing on her speedy trial motion.