When the Transcript Doesn’t Support the Court’s Decision

People v. Aguilar, 4th District Court of Appeal (Jan 1, 2026)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 was enacted to curb the unlawful use of peremptory challenges during jury selection.  In section 231.7, the legislature created several “presumptively invalid” reasons to kick jurors (subs (e) and (g)) and procedures upon 231.7 objections.  If challenger gives a “presumptively invalid reason,” they are to be given an opportunity to overcome the presumption.  This case presents such a challenge.

Aguilar was charged with crimes related to fleeing from, and shooting at, police officers.  At jury selection, the prosecutor asked Jurors 1 (described as Latina) and 4 (undescribed) questions related to a hypothetical.  This to supposedly probe the jurors ability to understand the element of intent.   

The Jurors 1 and 4 were asked their opinion of “Jane’s” intent in the following hypo.  Jane enters a fast-food restaurant, purchases a burger, takes it to a table, sits down, and brings the burger to her mouth, only to place it back on the table and exit the restaurant.  

Juror 1 was asked whether Jane’s exit changed Juror 1’s opinion that Jane entered the restaurant with the intent of eating a burger.

Juror 1: No.

Prosecutor: Okay, why?

Juror 1: Well, usually people are forgetful in that situation, so maybe she went out to go get something.  So, I wouldn’t assume that her intention was not to eat the burger.

Prosecutor: So, you believe that she intended to eat the burger, but something may have happened that caused her to leave it on the table?

Juror 1: Correct.

The prosecutor used a peremptory on Juror 1 and Aguilar objected saying the prosecution removed her because she was Latina.  The prosecutor proffered that they removed Juror 1 because she, “kept going back and forth with her answers . . . it didn’t make sense to me” as to the burger hypothetical.  The judge agreed Juror 1’s answers to the hypo were equivocal and found Juror 1 confused on the issue of intent.  Juror 1 was excused.

After the selected jury convicted him, Aguilar appealed, and the appellate court reversed. After a nice recitation of section 231.7, the panel finds the transcript does not contain substantial evidence that Juror 1 was equivocal or confused in her answers to the hypothetical.  Rather, her answers, supra, were clear, much clearer than those of Juror 4, who remained on the jury.  

The judgement is reversed and Aguilar gets a new trial.

H&S 11395 Defendants are Eligible for Mental Health Diversion via PC 1001.36

Reed v. Superior Court, First District (December 30, 2025)

Is a defendant charged with H&S §11395 eligible for pretrial mental health diversion (PC §1001.36), or is post-plea 11395 treatment the sole diversion option?

Reed had three felony cases.  One for violating H&S §11378 and two for H&S §11395.  Because the §11378 case was not eligible for 11395 treatment and dismissal, Reed requested mental health diversion for all three cases.  The prosecutor objected, arguing that 11395 cases were not eligible for mental health diversion due to the 11395 phrase, “[n]otwithstanding any other laws.”

The trial judge, in a textbook example of how not to interpret statutory language, agreed with the prosecution and ruled Reed’s 11395 cases were ineligible for 1001.36 diversion.  Reed petitioned for a writ of mandate. 

The appellate court held Reed’s 11395s were eligible for pretrial mental health diversion.  First, 11395 does not expressly say 11395 cases are excluded from 1001.36 mental health diversion.  The prosecution’s citation to the phrase, “notwithstanding any other laws,” gets the Inigo Montoya response by the panel.  It clarifies the phrase means to “override any law contrary.”  As 1001.36 says nothing contrary to 11395, the prosecution’s argument makes no sense.  Finally, the rule against implied repeal trumps the prosecution’s policy arguments cobbled together from various Voter Guides and Ballot Pamphlets.  

Reed gets his writ of mandate.  The trial court is directed to rule on whether Reed is suitable for pretrial mental health diversion for all three of his cases.  

Damaging a Jail (PC §4600(a)) is a More Specific Statute of Vandalism (PC §594) Under the Williamson Rule

People v. Jimenez (Fifth District, 01/01/2026)

Jimenez was in the county jail.  He used a broom handle to hit and crack his cell’s window.  The local prosecutor charged Jimenez with two crimes: [1] vandalism over 400 dollars per PC §594(a) and [2] damaging a jail per PC §4600(a).

At trial, a county facilities department employee testified the new window cost $245.47 and the cost to install the new window was $161.97.  The prosecutor argued Jimenez’s vandalism amount was the cost of the window and installation, $407.44.  The defense moved for acquittal, arguing the installation cost should not be included.  The trial court denied the defense motion and the jury convicted Jimenez on both counts.  Because he had a prior strike, Jimenez got six years.

On appeal, Jimenez argues the trial court got it wrong and that installation costs cannot be included to meet the $400 threshold which demarcates felony from misdemeanor.  He also argues that he could not be convicted of both counts under the Williamson rule.  

The panel holds the dollar amount for purposes of accessing vandalism includes the cost of installation.  It uses the “substantial nexus” test and finds the cost of installing the new window has a substantial nexus to Jimenez’s act of bashing the cell window.  His second argument, the Williamson rule precludes his §594 conviction gets more traction.  

The Williamson is a judicially created tool that precludes prosecution under a general statute for conduct that also violates a more specific statute.  This by inference that a legislature, in enacting the more specific statute, intended the conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.

The rule has been applied when [1] each element of the general corresponds to an element of the specific, or [2] it appears a violation of the specific will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general.  

The panel examines the two statutes here and determines that damaging jail property under PC §4600(a) would necessarily and commonly result in vandalism under §594.  So, Jimenez’s 594 conviction is reversed.  

Fortuitously for Jimenez, §4600(a) has a misdemeanor/felony point of $950, higher than the $400 line for §594.  This means Jimenez is now only guilty of a misdemeanor and is looking at one year inside instead of six.

California’s prohibitions on “Assault Weapons,” (PC §30605(a)), Carrying Loaded Guns not Registered to You (PC §25850(a), (c)(6)) and Large-Capacity Magazines (PC §32310(a)) all Pass Constitutional Muster

People v. McCowan (First District, Division One, 01/13/2026)

McCowan was pulled over for not using his turn signal.  Due to McCowan not having a valid license, the police had McCowan’s car towed.  While inventorying the car’s contents, police found a pistol.  The pistol had 13-round magazine, met California’s legal definition of an “assault weapon,” and was not registered to McCowan.

McCowan plead guilty to possessing an assault weapon, possessing a loaded gun unregistered to him, and possession of a gun magazine capable of holding more than 10 bullets.  

In the published portion of this opinion, the panel rejects McCowan’s arguments that the statutes under which he was convicted are facially unconstitutional because they violate the Second Amendment under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bruen opinion.

Two things stand out in this opinion.  First, California courts will engage in all sorts of circumlocutions to uphold gun restrictions.  Second, our current U.S. Supreme Court is not very capable at its job.  To paraphrase the late former Justice Sandra O’Connor, the job of the Supremes is to resolve the dispute in front of it and provide clear guidance to lower courts on how to resolve similar issues in the future.  Our Supremes succeed at the first (hard to imagine how it could fail) but are miserable at the latter.

The current state of Second Amendment jurisprudence from the Supremes is to ask the initial question of whether the “Second Amendment’s plain text covers the individual’s conduct,” prohibited by the statute.  If so, the burden is on the government to justify the statute by proving it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of gun laws.

How a court frames the first question is a giveaway as to its attitude towards gun regulation.  As to the “assault weapon” ban, McCowan frames the initial question as whether McCowan carrying a pistol for protection falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment.  Clearly it does.  McCowan then argues that there is no historical tradition of banning “assault weapons.”

In contrast, government frames the initial question as whether McCowan carrying an “assault weapon” for protection falls within the plain text.  It argues “assault weapons” are not the type of “arms” protected by the Second Amendment, thus the answer to the first question is, “no,” and that ends it, avoiding the messy historical tradition question. 

To be fair to this panel, its opinion upholding the Constitutionality of the three gun laws at issue can be objectively read as consistent with the Bruen decision.  But so could a Bruen-consistent opinion hold all three unconstitutional.

A Defendant Identified for PC §1172.75 Resentencing is Entitled to Resentencing Despite Being Paroled Prior to His Hearing.

People v. Washington (2nd Dist., Div. 1, 01/13/2026)

Washington’s 2019 eight-year prison sentence included two former PC §667.5(b) one-year enhancements, which were stayed under PC §654.

In 2020, with exceptions inapplicable here, the Legislature retroactively repealed §667.5(b) and enacted procedures for the identification of persons then serving sentences containing §667.5(b) enhancements.  These people were entitled to have their sentenced recalled and be resentenced according to current law.

Washington was identified in 2022 as such a person.  April 2024, he went back to the trial court for resentencing, but the trial court ruled Washington was not entitled to resentencing because while his sentence include two §667.5(b) enhancements, the fact they were stayed disqualified him from resentencing.  Washington appealed the trial court’s ruling.

While the appeal was pending, the California Supremes decided in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal. 4th 1050, that all sentences containing §667.5(b) enhancements, stayed or not, were to be vacated and a resentencing held.  Around the same time, Washington was released on parole.

This time around, the California AG cynically argues that Washington is no longer entitled to resentencing because he is no longer in custody.  The AG rightfully loses because the statutory language unambiguously includes people on parole.    The legal status of a parolee is that of a person in constructive custody of CDCR.  They do not possess the Constitutional rights of non-parolees, rather the limited rights of someone in actual custody.  And resentencing may have important consequences despite the §667.5(b) enhancements having been stayed.  If Washington is resentenced to less than his original sentence of eight years, he may apply any excess custodial credits towards reducing his period of parole.