Certain government attorneys do not like their client's (The People of the State of California) change of heart regarding criminal penalties. And neither do two justices on this Second District panel.
Mr. Harris bonked a pedestrian on the head and stole the guy's cellphone. Harris was charged with robbery, PC 211, and was alleged to have suffered a prior "strike" and served prior prison terms. His maximum exposure was 15 years. As in almost all criminal cases, the prosecution and defense negotiated a plea bargain: Harris would plead to grand theft from a person, PC 487(c), admit the "strike", and get six years in prison. The balance of the charges and allegations would be dismissed. Both sides received a benefit. Harris avoided picking up another strike and received a sentence less than half of his maximum should he take his case to trial and lose. The prosecution avoided having to prepare and conduct a jury trial (no small task) that there was no guarantee they would win (nothing is ever certain in our legal system).
While serving his sentence, the People of the State of California passed Proposition 47, which reduced Harris' crime of grand theft to petty theft, an offense punishable by 180 days in the county jail. Harris petitioned to have his conviction reduced to a misdemeanor and to be resentenced to 180 days.
According to the language used in PC 1170.18, Harris' petition shall be granted, unless the court finds he poses an unreasonable threat to public safety. In the past, prosecutors tried to argue that despite the direct language in 1170.18, there exists an implicit exception for plea bargains. This was known as the "benefit of the bargain" argument. This argument was rejected, In re T.W.
Here, the government wisely tweaks their "benefit of the bargain" argument. They concede Harris is eligible under 1170.18 to have his case reduced to a 180-day misdemeanor, but assert that should he ask for this relief to which he is entitled, the government is entitled to have the court withdraw Harris' plea to enable the government to reinstate the original PC 211 charge. The Los Angeles trial court agrees with the government, grants Harris' petition, and promptly reinstates the original charges against Harris.
Harris petitions for a writ of mandate. The Second District summarily denies the petition. Harris petitions the California Supreme Court for review whereupon they direct the Second District to issue an order to show cause.
A divided panel denies writ relief holding that should Harris persist with his efforts at relief under PC 1170.18, the trial court can withdraw Harris' previous plea and, upon request of the government, reinstate all dismissed charges and allegations because in passing Proposition 47, the voters have denied the prosecution (the voters' lawyers) the benefit of their bargain. Furthermore, should Harris choose this route, he is not entitled to have his maximum sentence capped at six years.
What I find most ironic about the government's position is that their beef is actually with their own client, the People of the State of California. Their client voted to reduce the penalties for certain convictions. Usually a lawyer is charged with pursuing the goals of her client. But apparently there are exceptions.
The majority here justifies their holding by making a distinction between "statutory consequences of conviction" and negotiated terms of a plea bargain. They do this to get around a 2013 opinion of the California Supreme Court, Doe v. Harris, which states that inherent in California plea agreements is an agreement to future changes in the law. Doe involved a plea to a sex charge that, at the time of the plea, would not have resulted in public dissemination of Doe's status as a sex-offender. After the plea, the legislature changed the law, making Doe's status public. When Doe sought to withdraw his plea, the California Supreme Court held that when he made the plea deal, Doe was implicitly agreeing to such a future change in the law.
So what is really the difference with Mr. Harris? For one, the statutory change at issue inures to the benefit of the defendant, not against him as in Doe. So what kind of meretricious trope can the panel dredge up? They call the change in Doe's case a non-negotiable "statutory consequence" and make up a rule that the holding in Doe only applies to such "statutory consequences" and not to negotiable plea terms, such as Harris' six year sentence. This is unlettered taurine egesta. What the panel really means is that when the law changes to the detriment of a defendant, the defendant loses, in the rare event the law changes to benefit the defendant, well, he should lose then too.
When I read the opinion, ignoring the outcome, I was surprised by the low quality of the legal writing. Specifically, the opinion appears to partly justify its holding on the basis that to hold otherwise would grant Harris a "windfall" (creating a new judicial cannon of non terram fructus). So what? If lawmakers change the law and the honest application of that change in law results in a windfall to a party, where is the judicial authority to ignore the law? Also, towards the end of the opinion, the author makes statements about the strength of the evidence against Mr, Harris, the righteousness of the 211 charge, and the fact defense counsel didn't present a defense (it was a plea bargain after all). What does this have to do with the legal effects of subsequent legislation on criminal plea bargains?
Then I saw the author was a Superior Court Judge sitting by designation. Maybe that is why page 13 appears as it does (doesn't anyone proofread these?)
Justice Mosk dissents and I'll leave it up to the reader to decide who has the better argument. The dissent doesn't recognize the majority's ham-handed discriminatory vehicle of "statutory consequence" (as California's criminal code is based entirely on statute, what term of a plea agreement could not be termed a "statutory consequence"?) and instead finds the Supreme Court's holding in Doe applies to defendants as well as the government. He also asks a question unanswered by the majority: From where does the trial court get its grant of jurisdiction to withdraw the plea entered years ago?
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