It is difficult to read this opinion without a tissue in hand. That Amanda A. has suffered through a "troubled history" is ineffectively euphemistic (and proof that Justice Kline should be introduced to Peter Meltzer). Any adult who believes criminology a straightforward matter of personal responsibility divorced from human development needs to read this opinion.
Amanda A. was neglected, abused, and exploited for the first 12 years of her life. Then things went downhill. She was raped at age 12 which led to her to run away from home and resulted in her being prostituted on the street by her 28 year old "boyfriend". She was made a dependency ward. As no 13 year old is capable of normal development in such a milieu, her next four years consisted of numerous cycles of running away from group homes, drugs, prostitution, exploitation, and rearrest.
She found herself again locked up in juvenile hall waiting for yet another group home to pick her up pursuant to a court order. When a probation officer visited Amanda to tell her the group home was coming, Amanda told the probation officer that when the group home representative showed up, Amanda intended to refuse to leave juvenile hall. In a rare instance of adult ratiocination in this case, the probation officer calls off the group home to avoid a scene.
The county prosecutor charges Amanda with obstructing a peace officer, PC 148(a)(1), a misdemeanor. The trial judge finds the facts prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and Amanda appeals. A pane from the First District reverses. In language hinting they really would have like to affirm, they do not. The holding is that all Amanda did was express an intent to obstruct the probation officer's attempt to effect the court's placement order, she never actually obstructed the probation officer.
In some benighted dicta, the panel suggests probation may have waited for the group home representative to arrive, then should Amanda make good on her promise, her refusal would constitute a righteous 148 (a laudable goal?). It reflects poorly on the panel that they would even imply that, by avoiding an unnecessary conflict and further psychological trauma to a minor, probation officer Webster's judgement was deficient.
Two lessons emerge from this opinion, neither involving the holding. First, the threat of incarceration is unlikely to successfully modify a child's behavior when that child's past environment was far worse. To paraphrase Amanda, "I have everything I need here (juvenile hall)"; no doubt that was not true of her first 12 years. Second, our juvenile justice system is inadequately funded. The saddest part of the opinion, in my opinion, is the sentence stating that after the Superior Court had instructed probation to find a group home with staff qualified to deal with children who had been sexually exploited and sexually traumatized, probation's response was that it was not an option for Amanda because such homes "all had long wait lists".
This is sad for multiple reasons. One that apparently we've decided as a state that it is too expensive to adequately fund treatment for children who have been sexually exploited. Two, that it took until Amanda was 17 for the government (of whom Amanda was a ward most of her life) to look into this option.
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