People v. Farwell: When a Stipulation at Trial Equals a Guilty Plea

Mr. Farwell was tried for vehicular manslaughter and driving while his license was suspended.  Farwell's lawyer wanted to shield the circumstances of the license suspension from the jury, so the defense entered into a stipulation that admitted all of the elements of the crime of driving while suspended.  Subsequently the jury convicted Farwell of both vehicular manslaughter and driving while his license was suspended.

On appeal, Farwell argues his conviction for driving while his license was suspended must be reversed because the court did not advise him of his right to a jury trial, his privilege against compelled incrimination, and his right to confront his accusers (Boykin/Tahl advisements) prior to accepting Farwell's stipulation.  Here is where I learned something new.

As the Second District's opinion states, when a stipulation contains facts satisfying each element of a crime, that stipulation is treated as an implied plea of guilty.  Before a defendant stipulates to such facts, he must be advised of his Boykin/Tahl rights in order for his plea to satisfy the Constitutional requirement of being "knowing and voluntary".  This is also true before a defendant stipulates to trial on a preliminary hearing transcript that gives him no hope of acquittal.  

The trial court did not give Farwell a traditional Boykin/Tahl advisement contemporaneous with the court accepting the stipulation.  The majority opinion believes that case law then directs them to examine the entirety of the record prior to the stipulation and determine if Farwell was advised of his rights prior. 

The record showed that during jury selection and 402 hearings for which Farwell was present, all three of the Boykin/Tahl rights were mentioned and discussed.  The majority finds that, under the totality of the record, Farwell had been indirectly advised of his rights sufficient to render his stipulation knowing and voluntary.  They go on to (IMEO) gild the lilly by using Farwell's prior record to impute to him knowledge of his rights.  They affirm his conviction.  

Justice Mosk dissents.  Mosk interprets the case law to break these kind of cases into two types: [1] "incomplete advisement" cases; and, [2] "silent record" cases.  According to the dissent, "incomplete advisement" is when the court gives an advisement contemporaneous with the stipulation, but the advisement is incomplete, while "silent record" is when there is no contemporaneous advisement.  Per Mosk, the "totality of the record" test is only applicable when the advisement is incomplete.  In a "silent record" case, Mosk believes reversal is required.  Based on a finding that Farwell's case is a "silent record" case, the dissent would reverse.