P v. Dobson (2nd Dist., Div.8) PC 1170.126 Doesn't Operate to Reduce the Maximum Confinement Time for NGI Hospital Patients

In 1998, Dobson was charged with stealing a car, VC 10851, and alleged to have suffered four prior strike offenses.  A jury found Dobson not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and he was committed to the State Hospital for a maximum of 25 years to life, reflecting the maximum sentence under the two-strikes-and-a-felony law effective at the time.

Comes 2014, and Dobson files a petition under PC 1170.126 to reduce his maximum confinement time.  The trial court denies his petition, finding that 1170.126 does not apply to NGI commitments, and Dobson appeals.

The Second District affirms.  

The threshold issue is one of statutory interpretation.  Section 1170.126 provides, in part.  

(a) The resentencing provisions under this section and related statutes are intended to apply exclusively to persons presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12, whose sentence under this act would not have been an indeterminate life sentence.

As the panel points out, this language is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation.  It excludes everyone except those serving a term of imprisonment.  And Dobson is not serving a term of imprisonment, he has been civilly committed to a State Hospital and may be released at any time if he regains his sanity and passes a supervision period.  

Dobson tries a second-line argument of equal protection, but this is a weak argument, given the schism between the interests underlying the NGI commitment scheme and the interests of the criminal punishment scheme.  The panel, with little surprise, finds the disparate treatment has a rational basis and rejects the argument.