Prior to November 4, 2014, Mr. Davis was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine, H&S 11377(a), and placed on felony probation. November 5, 2014, the law was changed, via Proposition 47, to reduce H&S 11377(a) to a misdemeanor. Davis returned to court and asked the court to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. The trial court responded, "OK, just file a PC 1170.18 petition." Davis responded that he wasn't eligible for a 1170.18 reduction because eligibility under that section requires a defendant be "currently serving a sentence" and probation is not a sentence. The trial court disagreed, Davis filed a 1170.18 petition under protest, and the court granted the petition, reducing Davis' 11377(a) conviction to a misdemeanor.
Why all the fuss from Davis? The speculation is that Davis sought to avoid the firearm prohibition built into 1170.18. Section 1170.18 states that a conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under 1170.18 is a misdemeanor for all purposes, except it does not permit the defendant to possess a gun. Davis may have been thinking that if could obtain a reduction prior to "sentencing", his conviction would not carry a firearm prohibition.
The First District affirms the trial court's ruling, holding that probation is a "sentence" for purposes of PC 1170.18.
The opinion is a exemplary application of the rules of statutory interpretation. The language is examined, found to be ambiguous, and then analyzed within the context of the ends sought by the initiative, as expressed through ballot materials. You may or may not agree with the result, but the method cannot be faulted.
Most impressive to me is that the panel wisely disregarded the parties undisciplined initial bombardment of policy arguments and analogy to precedent in favor of a solid statutory analysis.
As an aside, my prescience identifies a Constitutional issue created by this decision. The Second Amendment, at a minimum, confers the right to possess a gun within one's home for self defense. This Constitutional right is not absolute and prohibiting felons from possessing guns probably passes Constitutional muster. But such exceptions to this Second Amendment right are certainly subject to equal protection principles. Which creates the problem here. Davis, who possessed methamphetamine in 2014, is now a misdemeanant whose Second Amendment right to armed self defense has been taken away due to his prior possession of methamphetamine. Would I be caught today with the same amount of methamphetamine, my crime would be a misdemeanor, and I would retain my Second Amendment right to armed self defense. If Davis were to challenge this disparate treatment how could California respond? Is there any rational reason to treat Davis and me differently, as to a fundamental Constitutional right, for the identical transgression?
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