P v. Williams (2nd Dist., Div.2) PC 1170.18 Relief Will Not Operate to Negate a Previously Imposed PC 667.5(b) Enhancement

In 2013, Mr. Williams received a felony prison sentence that included a one year enhancement under PC 667.5(b) for a 2008 felony conviction for commercial burglary.  While serving his sentence, Proposition 47 was enacted and subsequently Williams' 2008 commercial burglary conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor.  Now Williams asserts his 2013 sentence should be reduced by one year because his 2008 burglary conviction is now a misdemeanor, and misdemeanors cannot enhance a sentence under PC 667.5(b).  The trial court disagreed and denied Williams' request.  An appeal followed.

The Second District affirms, joining the Fourth District (Carrea) and the Fifth District (Ruff).

The essence of the holding is that when the statute says a 1170.18 reduction is to be treated as a misdemeanor "for all purposes" what it really means is "for all purposes from this point on".  The basis for the panel's holding is an argument by analogy from PC 17B, a statute conferring judicial discretion to reduce certain felonies to misdemeanors, which also contains the phrase "for all purposes".  Cases construing 17B have held that a reduction under that section are only effective from the time of reduction onward.

Williams has some good arguments, though.  The best is that the language is unambiguous.  For all purposes should be interpreted to mean for all purposes, and any other interpretation is really just a judicial revision.  The panel doesn't really know how to get around this argument, and rather disingenuously states that,

Defendant urges that we depart from the general canon of statutory interpretation that points us to section 17’s interpretation and that we instead read the phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” literally, giving effect to the lexical truism that “all means all” . . .  The canon we cite above, like all interpretive canons, is merely a “guide”  

The reason this is disingenuous is that the Williams is not asking the panel to "depart from the general canon", rather Williams is asking the panel to rigorously follow the primary canon which is the test for ambiguity.  The panel puts the cart before the horse, diving into policy, pragmatism, initiative history, etc. before looking to the words and giving them their ordinary meanings.   Recall that without first finding ambiguity, resort to other materials is to be avoided.  Thus the panel looks rather silly insinuating that textual analysis and assigning words their ordinary definitions is merely a "guide".

Williams also points out that, should you find ambiguity and go to the next step, the cannon of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as impliedly excluding others) supports his position.  Section 1170.18, after stating the reduction is "for all purposes" goes on to state a specific exception, firearm possession.  So applying the cannon, had lawmakers wanted to exclude 667.5(b) enhancements, they would have listed it alongside the firearm exclusion.

But in the end, the panel bypasses these points and it is the analogy to PC 17B that carries the day.