Mr. Hopkins is a combat veteran. He served in Afghanistan where he was responsible for the detention of Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives.
After coming home, Hopkins began to display signs of PTSD. In May of 2015, he began receiving treatment from the VA for his ailment. In August of 2015, he picked up a misdemeanor DUI charge.
Hopkins asked the trial court to give him a shot at diversion pursuant to PC 1001.80, a code section enacted in 2014 that allows trial courts, in misdemeanor cases, to place a veteran suffering from a service-related illness in a pre-trial diversion program to give the veteran an opportunity to avoid a criminal conviction. The trial judge in Los Angeles denied his request and the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court denied his writ petition.
Now the Second District reverses (disagreeing with the Fourth District in P v. VanVleck).
This is one damn fine opinion. I am often critical of California appellate courts when they churn out plebeian opinions in which they substitute an undeserved air of infallibility in place of meaningful analysis. This opinion however is exemplary and belongs in a law school text.
The issue here is the intersection of two statutes, PC 1001.80 and VC 23640. Section 1001.80 says that "whenever" a military veteran suffering from a service-related illness is charged with a misdemeanor, the trial court may place him in a pre-trial diversion program. Section 23640 says that pre-trial diversion is prohibited in all DUI cases. You can see the problem.
The opinion recognizes the guidance the California Supreme Court has provided for cases involving inconsistent statutes. With admirable assiduousness the opinion applies each rule and, with refreshing intellectual honesty, shows how none of them resolve the issue. The finest portion of the opinion, IMEO, is when the panel applies the "specific trumps general" rule, revealing the rule's impotence.
How the question is framed provides the answer; you can choose your result. Section 1001.80 addresses "all misdemeanors" while 23640 addresses only DUI misdemeanors. So 23640 is the more specific and should prevail, right? Hold on. What if you describe 1001.80 as addressing misdemeanors committed by military veterans who are currently suffering from a small category of illnesses while 23640 addresses all DUIs? Now which one is more specific?
The most admirable aspect of this opinion is that, instead of framing the issue to give the result desired, the opinion explicitly acknowledges that the "specific v. general" rule provides no real answers. Once this is acknowledged, the opinion goes down the road of examining the legislative history behind section 1001.80 and ends up deciding that the legislature intended for 1001.80 to trump 23640.
I don't know if newly minted appellate court justices have an orientation program, but if they do, this opinion should be required reading.
I have no background in law but I like to know how it applies and functions (well or not). I came across your blog by chance but find it very interesting and informative.
ReplyDeleteThis particular post was more than informative, it brought real clarity to the whole process. And I'm glad the veteran benefited from the decision.
Thank you for such an affirmative post.