In 2009, Ms. Huerta and a companion walked into a Sears department store and tried to steal several bottles of perfume. A store detective caught them as they tried to leave the store. Huerta had 463 dollars of perfume in her bag and her companion had 174.50 dollars worth in her bag.
The State charged Huerta with, among other crimes, second degree felony burglary. Huerta pleaded to the felony burglary charge and received 16 months in the state prison.
In 2015, Huerta returned to the trial court and filed a petition under PC 1170.18 to reduce her 2009 burglary conviction to a misdemeanor. In the petition, Huerta's lawyer claimed that the burglary involved property worth less than 950 dollars. The State responded only that Huerta had the burden to prove her eligibility. The trial court set the matter for a hearing.
At the hearing, Huerta's lawyer said the perfumes Huerta took were worth 463 dollars and those her companion took were worth 174.50 dollars. The State did not object to these amounts but argued that Huerta was not eligible for relief because she went into Sears with an accomplice. This fact, the State argued, provided proof of an uncharged conspiracy. So since Huerta went into the store to commit a conspiracy, her crime did not fall under the PC 459.5 definition of shoplifting. The trial court granted the petition and reduced Huerta's conviction to a misdemeanor. The State's Attorneys (led by their chief job-holder Ms. Harris) , having not yet exhausted their zeal for gormless resistance to the clear will of their client, appealed.
The Fourth District affirms.
The State's first argument is that the trial court erred when it did not summarily dismiss Huerta's petition upon receipt. I'm sure the attorney for the State thought this a clever argument since it was the Second Division of the Fourth District that decided P v. Perkins, which held a petitioner had the burden to include some form of evidence with her pleading. The panel properly slaps down this casuistry. Although unmentioned, Perkins was decided on January of 2016, while Huerta filed her petition in April of 2015. As the text of 1170.18 gives no guidance on what procedures are appropriate, this argument evinces this particular State attorney to be wont to make arguments I can only describe as (to quote "Time Bandits") "pure concentrated evil".
The panel, for good measure, goes on to demonstrate that even if the State attorney's malefic argument were worthy of consideration, (s)he still loses. As our courts are to liberally allow pleadings to be amended when there is a "reasonable possibility" the defect can be cured, the panel states that had the trial court summarily denied Huerta's petition for the reasons asserted by the State, such a denial would have been an abuse of discretion.
Apparently incapable of embarrassment, the State has another argument. Since Huerta went into Sears to steal perfumes with a companion, her intent upon entry was not just to commit larceny, but to also commit the crime of conspiracy. The panel disposes of this argument quickly. First, Huerta's conviction was for entering Sears with an intent to steal perfume. The issue in a 1170.18 petition is whether the crime of conviction would have been a misdemeanor following the November 4, 2014, amendments to the Penal Code. And had Huerta walked into Sears to steal 473 dollars of perfumes on November 5, 2014, her crime would have been a misdemeanor under PC 459.5.
Furthermore, even if indulged, the argument that Huerta is ineligible for relief because she entered Sears with an intent to commit the crime of conspiracy fails upon the application of a mere scintilla of logic. Conspiracy, the crime of agreement, requires an intent to commit a target crime. And here the target crime could only have been the theft of perfume. So the argument collapses upon itself; even if Huerta was guilty of walking into Sears with the intent to commit the crime of conspiracy, she necessarily was also guilty of walking into Sears with the intent to commit theft under 950 dollars.
According to the plain language of PC 459.5, whenever a crime can be charged as shoplifting, it shall be charged as shoplifting.
[note to the panel in P v. Varner: (blog post here, opinion here) Look at how Huerta's petition is affirmed even though her crime of conviction, PC 459, doesn't appear within PC 1170.18]
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