P v. Sauceda (5th Dist.) Vehicle Code 10851 Conviction Ineligible for Penal Code 1170.18 Relief

2006, Mr. Sauceda was convicted of violating California Vehicle Code Section 10851 and sentenced to prison.  Following the 2014 passage of Proposition 47, Sauceda petitioned the trial court to reduce his 10851 conviction to a misdemeanor, arguing that, if committed today, his crime would have necessarily been a misdemeanor via PC 490.2.  The trial court denied his petition and he appealed.

The Fifth District affirms.

As in many similar opinions, the result is defensible but not the analysis.  Although avoided, the real issue is the intersection of VC 10851, PC 490.2, and PC 487(d)(1).  Vehicle Code section 10851, the statute of conviction, criminalizes "taking or driving" someone else's vehicle, with the intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of possession.  Penal Code section 487(d)(1) defines a form of grand theft as taking someone else's car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.  Penal Code section 490.2 (added via 2014's Proposition 47) makes theft of "any property" a misdemeanor if the value of the property is 950 dollars or less.  

This case could have wisely been decided on the basis that the facts of Sauceda's conviction were not within the record.  For reasons indiscernible, the panel unnecessarily extends its analysis and in doing so demonstrates its ineptitude.  

Because the factual basis of Sauceda's conviction are not within the record, two scenarios are possible.  First, Sauceda drove the car, without the owner's permission, with an intent to temporarily deprive the owner of her interest (read, "joy riding").  The alternative scenario is that Sauceda drove, or took, the car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of her interest (read "stole the car").  

If the former scenario is true, the issue is whether a necessarily lesser included offenses may be punished more severely than the greater offense.  Had Sauceda taken the car with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of her interest, this would have been a "theft", arguably falling within the more specific statute of PC 487(d)(1) which is subsumed by PC 490.2 when the car is a hoopty (worth less than 950 bucks).  On the other hand, had Sauceda been joy riding, such a crime would be a necessarily lesser included of PC 487(d)(1), creating the issue of whether a necessarily lesser included crime may be punished more severely than its greater.  

Avoiding both of these issues, the panel here phrases the issue as whether Proposition 47 sought to modify VC 10851, an inadequately veiled example of ignoratio elenchi.  The answer to this question can only be "no", as it textually did not modify 10851.  However such framing does nothing to address the actual legal issues at play.

A more adroit panel would have simply affirmed the denial because the appellate record did not specify a factual basis upon which the trial court could have been said to have erred (value of the car; whether it was a theft or joyride).  Instead it issues a misguided opinion that leads any learned reader to question its competence.