In re J.G. (1st Dist, Div.3) Juvenile Court's Finding that Ward's Completion of Probation was "Unsatisfactory" Reversed For Legal Misinterpretation of WI 786

2011 was an eventful year for Master J.G.  In January, he admitted to burglarizing a residence, was made a ward of the juvenile court based on same, and was ordered to complete a nine-month "Youth Rehabilitation Center" (YRC) program.  Additionally, J.G. was ordered to pay 2,200 dollars in restitution.  

After this rough start to 2011, J.G. turned it around quickly.  He completed the requirements of the nine-month YRC program after only six months, received excellent reviews from the YRC staff, and was released early on [sic] "parole".  In December of 2011, J.G. returned to the juvenile court for a "parole" review.  According to his mom, J.G. was doing great at school, following her rules at home, doing his chores, and holding down a part time job at a local eatery.  The probation officer reported that all of J.G.'s drug tests had been negative and that he was in compliance with the court's orders.  The juvenile court then terminated his "parole" successfully, but continued J.G. as a ward of the court.

Fast forward to 2016, when the probation department requested the court to terminate J.G.'s wardship as he was now 22 and beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  The sole issue was whether the court should order J.G.'s probation be terminated "satisfactorily" or "unsatisfactorily".  This is important (as we'll later see).

The State argued that J.G.'s performance was not satisfactory because he did not pay any of the 2,200 dollars of restitution ordered.  J.G. countered with a citation to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 which provides, in pertinent part,

An unfulfilled order or condition of restitution, including a restitution fine that can be converted to a civil judgment under Section 730.6 or an unpaid restitution fee shall not be deemed to constitute unsatisfactory completion of supervision or probation under this section.

The juvenile court interpreted this statute to apply only to unpaid restitution that can be converted to a civil judgment under 730.6.  Then the juvenile court found that since J.G. was 22 (beyond the jurisdictional age) it could not convert the restitution to a civil judgment under 730.6.  Deeming J.G.'s unpaid restitution beyond the scope of 786, the juvenile court used it to find J.G.'s  completion of probation "unsatisfactory".  J.G. appealed.

The First District reverses and remands to the juvenile court to enter a finding of "satisfactory" completion.

The reason this is a big deal for J.G. is because upon a "satisfactory finding", he is entitled to have his case dismissed, his court files sealed, attendant records in the hands of law enforcement sealed, and his arrest is deemed to have never occurred.  It is an important component of the juvenile legal system that youngsters who turn it around are to have their slates wiped clean and not have their adult lives restricted for some pubescent monkeyshines.  

The issue really revolves around the statutory language above and the juvenile court's two findings.  Both findings are wrong, but the panel, with admirable judicial restraint, recognizes that correction the second error (the finding of a lack of jurisdiction to convert restitution to a civil judgment) resolves the issue.  

While juvenile courts lose general jurisdiction over wards at particular ages (depending on the particular case), they retain jurisdiction for purposes of restitution.  Thus the juvenile court's finding that it could base an unsatisfactory finding on unpaid restitution because it no longer had the ability to convert the restitution to a civil judgment was wrong.  It actually had the jurisdiction to convert the order to a civil judgment, thus the outstanding restitution could not provide a basis for an unsatisfactory finding, even if its first finding was correct.

The other error, IMEO, is the first finding.  The statutory language is unambiguous that the subject "unfulfilled order or condition of restitution" is not limited by the phrase, " including a restitution fine that can be converted to a civil judgment under Section 730.6".  Rather, as indicated by the word "including", the former phrase is more expansive and limited only by its ordinary meaning.  

But this matters not.  Since juvenile courts retain jurisdiction for purposes of converting restitution to civil judgments, J.G. and those similarly situated, cannot be denied the benefits of a satisfactory finding based solely on their (lack of) wealth.