The operative facts in both these cases are the same. A juvenile was found to fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for his commission of a felony crime. After the passage of Proposition 47 in 2014, each boy had his felony recalled and was disposed (sentenced) as a misdemeanant. Both boys asked the juvenile court to expunge their DNA from the State's database because, they argued, they met the criteria for expungement under PC 299. The juvenile courts denied the requests and both boys appealed.
The First District affirms in both matters.
When I first began this blog, an experienced appellate attorney told me that California's Courts of Appeal resided within the slum of legal reasoning. If the sole evidence were these two opinions, I would be forced to agree.
The issue concerns the intersection of PC 1170.18 and PC 299. Both panels are eager to affirm the respective denials and both do so sloppily. It is difficult to pick a loser here.
In re C.B., the panel affirms the denial by analogy to PC 17b. Section 17b is a code section that deals with crimes that are chargeable, ,and punishable, as either felonies or misdemeanors at the respective discretions of the trial court and the State. In re C.H., the affirmance is based on the fact the legislature, after C.H.'s denial, amended PC 299 in a way which arguably violates Section 15 of Proposition 47, and hence the California Constitution. This issue is, to no one's surprise, ignored.
The central problem with both opinions is that they never quote the operative text of 1170.18. Section 1170.18 provides a vehicle for a felon to petition to have his sentence RECALLED and to be resentenced as a misdemeanant. "Recalled", per Blacks Law Dictionary, means to cancel or reverse. Both opinions never mention this operative word, "recalled", instead substituting their own word, "redesignated", a word that does not appear in 1170.18.
Once having executed this shameful substitution, the panel in C.B. can employ their 17b analogy without appearing ridiculous. It is freed from having to recognize that the relief available in the two different code sections is fundamentally different. One, 17b, involves a crime that is capable of two different categorizations, and the result when the category is changed before sentence is pronounced. The other, 1170.18, involves a procedure by which an imposed sentence is recalled (reversed or canceled) and the crime then resentenced as a misdemeanor.
The panel in C.H. proves even less capable. Proposition 47, enacted by the voters of California, became part of the California Constitution. The only method by which the mob of half-anonymous asses who huddle under the title of the California Legislature can change Proposition 47, is found in Section 15. Section 15 requires any amendment have 2/3 passage in both houses and only when the amendment is consistent with the goals of Proposition 47. After C.H. was denied his expungement, the aforementioned legislature amended PC 299 to exclude PC 1170.18 relief from the category of persons entitled to expungement.
This creates a legitimate legal issue of whether this amendment was constitutional. Did it amend Proposition 47? Did it pass by 2/3 of both houses? Is it consistent with Proposition 47?
Instead of actually addressing these weighty issues, the panel in C.H. holds that the legislatures' amendment serves as evidentiary support as to what the electorate meant when they passed Proposition 47. Think about the logic of this argument for a moment.
Hopefully the California Supreme Court will decide this issue. I can accept a decision either way, but only in an opinion that evinces a modicum of legitimate legal reasoning.
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