P v. Spiller (5th Dist.) In PC 1170.126, "Prior" Means Prior to the Conviction Which Is the Subject of The Relief Sought

In 1997, Mr. Spiller was convicted of five counts of robbery, PC 211, a strike offense.  

In 1998, he was convicted of smuggling methamphetamine into prison, PC 4573, and conspiracy to commit same.  As he had five prior strikes from the robberies, he was sentenced to 25-life under the old "at least two prior strikes plus any subsequent felony" law. 

In 2001, while serving his 25-life for the smuggling conviction, he was convicted of, among other crimes, attempted murder, PC 664/187.  For this he was sentenced to 45-life, to be served consecutive to the 25-life sentence.  So if he lived until 2068, Spiller could make his pitch to the parole board.

Following the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Spiller petitioned the trial court, under PC 1170.126, to reduce his 1998 smuggling sentence from 25-life to double the applicable determinate term.  The trial court ruled Spiller was ineligible for the relief he sought because of his 2001 conviction for attempted murder.  Spiller appealed.

The Fifth District reverses and remands.

The issue concerns section 1170.126, which states in pertinent part,

[A] petition for a recall of sentence … specify all of the currently charged felonies, which resulted in the sentence . . . and shall also specify all of the prior convictions . . . 

 An inmate is eligible for resentencing if: 

(1) The inmate is serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment . . .  for a conviction of a felony or felonies that are not defined as serious and/or violent felonies. 

(2) The inmate’s current sentence was not imposed for any of the offenses appearing in clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12. 

(3) The inmate has no prior convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12. 

Eligibility is thus conditioned upon three things, the first two of which are not in dispute.  Spiller's smuggling conviction was not a serious or violent felony and his smuggling offense did not appear in the code sections referred to in (2).  It is the third condition that causes the trouble here.  Spiller's 2001 attempted murder offense conviction does appear in 667(e)(2)(C).  Therefore if that conviction is a "prior" he is ineligible for relief.  But the question is "prior to what?".  Prior to the offense for which relief is sought (the 1998 smuggling) or prior to now?  If the former, Spiller is eligible.  If the latter, he is not.  It is a question of statutory interpretation.  

The key is the first line of the indented citation above.  The statute refers to the offense for which relief is sought (here the 1998 smuggling) as the "current offense", indicating the proper temporal reference point.  If the statute is going to consider the 1998 smuggling as the current offense, the term "prior offense" can only refer to convictions before the smuggling.  

The State tries to goad the panel into abandoning its admirable judicial rigor in examining the intent expressed by the text, but fortunately the panel recognizes this for the casuistry it is and resists. 

The result is fine.  Spiller is not getting out (regardless of this petition, he is doing at least 51-life) and the statutory text has been respected by the appellate court.