P v. Grimes (Cal. S.Ct.) Death Penalty Reversed For Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence

Mr. Grimes, along with Mssrs. Wilson and Morris, robbed a 98-year old lady and burgled her home.  During these crimes, Morris killed the lady.  Morris killed himself after one day in jail.  Grimes proceeded to trial where he was convicted of first degree murder with the special circumstance of felony murder.  The jury decided the State should kill Grimes.

Following a rehearing, the California Supreme Court affirms the conviction, but reverses the jury's decision to offer up Grimes in the antidiluvian ritual of human sacrifice.

The main issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding statements made by Morris to Wilson's girlfriend, Sheila.  Morris told Sheila that he had actually killed the lady and that Grimes did not participate in the killing, rather Grimes had looked at Morris with a look of "what are you doing?".  The trial court allowed the portion of Morris' statement where he admitted being the actual killer, but excluded the portions where he disclaimed Grimes' participation in the killing.

The schism between the majority and the dissenters begins with the proper standard of review.  The dissenters want to limit the review to a deferential look at whether the trial court's decision was, facially, an abuse of discretion.  The majority wants to first look at whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law and then proceed to the abuse of discretion analysis.

The law at issue is the hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 1203, which spares from exclusion otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements, specifically

 a statement that when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.

The trial court took a narrow approach to this language and reasoned that while Morris' statement that he killed the lady certainly subjected him to criminal liability, the qualification that he did so without Grimes' assistance did nothing to increase Morris' liability.  

The majority disagrees, taking a broader approach to the interpretation of 1203, a section that codifies a common law hearsay exception based upon the principle that reasonable people will not fabricate a statement that operates to their detriment, giving such a statements the gloss of reliability.  So while Morris may not have technically increased his criminal liability by saying Grimes did not participate in the killing, a reasonable person would understand such a statement as being against his interest.  Which makes sense.  Such a statement takes away the ability to argue, in mitigation, that Morris was just following orders, had been forced by his fellow conspirators to commit the murder, or was somehow less culpable than the others. 

Because the trial judge's narrow interpretation of section 1203 was incorrect, his eventual decision was an abuse of discretion, says the majority.  And it prejudiced Grimes during the penalty phase, taking away evidentiary support for an argument that Grimes had no personal intent to hurt the lady, based upon his reaction when he saw Morris' murder the lady.  

Thus, Grimes convictions remain, but he will now serve a sentence of life without parole.

As I read the majority and dissenting opinions, it became clear the current California Supreme Court has two tiers of justices.  One tier tends towards an objective, thorough and academic analysis, as its members' backgrounds would suggest.  The second tier is more reptilian in nature and evinces a thought process based in personal convenience, a trait often found in government lawyers who have found themselves elevated to their respective levels of incompetence.