P v. Wagner (4th Dist, Div.1) An Order Revoking Parole Is a "Judgment" Eligible For PC 1473.6 Relief

Back in 2006, Mr. Wagner was convicted of, among other crimes, impersonating a policeman.  He served his time and was released on parole in 2011.  

In 2014, the State alleged Wagner had violated his parole by driving around in a black Ford Crown Victoria that looked like a police cruiser, after being told by his parole agent to stop driving that car. 

 At a hearing on the allegations, the parole officer testified that prior to May 13, 2014, Wagner had been seen driving the black Crown Vic.  Due to Wagner's previous conviction for impersonating a policeman, the parole officer testified that during a May 13, 2014, meeting with Wagner, he told Wagner to stop driving the Crown Vic.  May 28, 2014, Wagner was again seen driving the Crown Vic.  Wagner and his girlfriend, who also was present at the May 13, 2014, meeting, both testified that the parole officer said nothing about the Crown Vic during the meeting.  The trial judge (no surprise) believed the parole officer, revoked Wagner's parole, and sent him to jail for 120 days.  

Wagner did his 120 days.  After he was released, Wagner obtained the text of emails sent to and by the parole officer.  In one of the emails sent from the parole officer to a policeman, the parole officer wrote that he "did not plan to speak to Wagner about the Crown Vic on May 13, 2014".

Wagner then filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.6.  The trial court denied the motion without reaching the merits on the basis that an order revoking parole was not a "judgment" within the meaning of 1473.6.  Wagner appealed.

The Fourth District reverses.

The opinion contains an nice primer on section 1473.6, a statute of which I was previously unaware.  It resulted from the Rampart scandal which uncovered a long period of extensive corruption within the Los Angeles police department.  While those innocents sitting in jail because of the evidence-planting and perjury uncovered could avail themselves of the vehicle of habeas corpus, the poor saps who had already served time for convictions based upon police lies and misdeeds were stuck.  There was no procedural vehicle for them to vacate their convictions and get back their good names, regardless of the strength of the evidence that their convictions were solely the result of police perjury or other criminal behavior.  So the legislature crafted section 1473.6, which gives those who have already done their time a vehicle to move to vacate a judgment if they can show the judgment was the result of State misconduct.

The question here is whether an order to revoke a person's parole is a "judgment" under 1473.6.  First the panel looks to the California Codes. Code of Civil Procedure section 577 defines judgment as a "final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding".  Second the panel examines how parole revocations are treated in the appellate realm.  Finally it examines the impact of parole revocations upon the parolee.  All of these factors favor a finding that parole revocations are "judgments" under 1473.6.

The case is remanded for Wagner to have his day in court where the parole officer will, no doubt, have some explaining to do.