September of 2014, Mr. Hronchak was sent to prison for 16 months for felony possession of a controlled substance, HS 11377(a). Soon after the electorate passed Proposition 47, Hronchak returned to court where his felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and he was released with credits of 360 days. He was also placed on parole for one year as provided for in PC 1170.18.
A couple of months down the road, Hronchak violated his parole by absconding. The parole office wanted the judge to give Hronchak 135 days in jail for the violation. Hronchak argued he shouldn't be subject to any time in jail for his violation since he was on parole for a misdemeanor that carried a maximum sentence of 364 days.
The trial judge, Solomonesque IMEO, admitted that Hronchak's argument had some logical appeal, but the result would be to render Hronchak's parole meaningless as there could be no consequence for future violations. So the judge gave Hronchak 60 days and reinstated his parole. Hronchak appealed.
The Second District affirms.
The decision makes sense. And while the legal analysis supporting it is fine, the most compelling reason is that cited by the trial judge, to wit, that setting an outer limit for total custody time to 364 days would render the parole provision of section 1170.18 meaningless for Hronchak and most others similarly situated. I was surprised the panel did not analogize the misdemeanor parole at issue here to the traditional felony parole. There are reams of opinions authorizing additional custody time for parole violations despite the parolee having already served the maximum legal sentence. It would seem reasonable that the parole statutes are to be applied as written regardless of the underlying crime.
While I do not assert that the 1170.18 parole provision is ambiguous, I do wonder if those responsible for writing Proposition 47 actually meant "probation" instead of parole. Especially given the recent changes to the parole system in 2011.
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